A
Downward Spiral of Decline into Disorder
“…at the community level, disorder and crime
are usually inextricably linked, in a kind of developmental sequence. ‘Social
psychologists and police officers tend to agree that if a window in a building
is broken and is left unrepaired, all of the rest of the windows will soon be
broken. This is true in nice neighbourhoods as in rundown ones’ (Wilson and
Kelling, 1983)”.
The
destructive effects of observed disorder and squalid conditions in the
environment have been broadly recognised. There are a number of empirical
studies that have suggested that insalubrious environments beget morally
contemptible behaviours (- see Sampson
and Groves 1989; Cohen, Spear, Scribner, Kissinger, Mason and Wildgen, 2000; Sampson
and Raudenbush, 2004; Keizer, Lindenburg and Steg, 2008; Tonry, 2009) suggesting that the environment sends potent symbolic messages
that both regulate and release individual conduct.
The
criminological theory Broken Windows (Wilson and Kelling, 1983) suggests that
the pre-eminent indicators of the spiral of decline into criminal degradation
are the growth of incivilities and a fanning of the flames of disorder, but not
crime itself: wherein lies the implication that areas of high anti-social behaviour
is where action is needed most, and from which one would be forgiven for
inferring that high crime areas should be considered irredeemable.
Broken Windows was an exploration of urban degeneration (the
antithesis of gentrification) that suggested if cultures and climates of
disorder were permitted to develop and normalise, then serious crime would grow
‘as certainly as night follows day’ (Wilson and Kelling, 1983; Kelling, 2001;
Barton and Kelling, 2006), but Taylor and Covington (1988) found that areas
undergoing the gentrification process suffered increasing violence during the
transition period (Hughes, 2007).
It is important to bear in mind that the theory
was introduced in the 1982 article by the American politico-social scientist and Neo-Conservative ‘eminence grise’ James Q. Wilson – an advisor on crime to
President Reagan - and George L. Kelling (a former probation officer turned
academic) in the Atlantic Monthly Magazine which is not a criminology journal,
and therefore perhaps not written for either an academic or policy audience.
Though it has been subject to great debate both within social scientific thought and in the public sphere through
policy discourse where there exists a not insignificant corpus of criticism, it
has become the sine qua non contribution
to the debate on social disorganisation, crime prevention and informal social
control backed up by support from several empirical studies. The theory has also
been used as an impetus for several reforms in criminal justice policy. The broken windows theory has also found support from the public health
arena: Cohen et al. (2000) found that after controlling for household income, ethnicity,
(un)employment rates, and level of education, a high “broken windows index” (such
as high incidences of litter, graffiti, public intoxication, rubbish, abandoned
cars, and ruined housing) independently predicted neighbourhood gonorrhoea
rates (- see Sampson and Raudenbush, 2004).
James Q Wilson
1931-2012
We must also take care in not being complacent with regards to the implications
for, and penetration into social psychology when considering the significance
of disorder. As far as social psychologists are concerned, disorder is still a
negative concept but carries with it serious and ‘harmful consequences’ for
individual health and well-being (Sampson and Raudenbush, 2004).
According to Sampson and Raudenbush (2004) a number of recent studies
that they analysed demonstrated that there is a significant correlatory
relationship between disorder (as perceived by the community) and physical
decline, dysthymia, general psychological distress and helplessness.
Prof. George Kelling
Wilson and Kelling’s (1983) ‘Broken Windows Theory states that the maintenance and monitoring of
urban environments in a well-ordered condition can act to stop further
vandalism and escalation into a downward spiral of degeneration into more
serious crime and increased incidences of ‘disorder’ (Wilson and Kelling, 1983;
Kelling, 2001; Barton and Kelling, 2006). It was never meant to be taken as an
attempt to cut the Gordian knot, but it was argued that if ‘disorder’ was
stamped out, serious crime could be prevented and, a priori, communities would be ‘nicer’, which meant fear of crime
would diminish and would result in an increase in informal social controls
(Carr, 2007). Lewis and Salem (1986) and Perkins and Taylor (1996) remind us
however, that community perception of crime, let alone ‘disorder’, is heterogeneous:
dependent on the cultural, social and political resources available (Sampson
and Raudenbush, 2004).
But
what is disorder if not a Capuletesque take on anti-social behaviour? But then
the question must be asked: what is anti-social behaviour? For many of us that
attempt to answer this question, we find ourselves in the position of United
States Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart attempting to define his ‘threshold
test’ for obscenity: I know it when I see it (Jacobellis v. Ohio, 1964).
Justice Potter Stewart
1915-1985
Associate Justice US Supreme Court
Defining
disorder has been problematic (Comfort, 2005; Carrabine, Cox, Lee, Plummer, and
South, 2009; McLaughlin and Muncie, 2010; Croall, 2011). There exists no less
than four distinct and competent operational definitions of disorder coming
from discourse political, psychiatric, social, and legal. Though each of these
particular definitions are a product of the individual philosophies behind the
areas of expertise, that should not suggest that each in turn cannot nor should
not be used to mutually inform and edify the other, or even move to create a
universally accepted synthetic definition of disorder.
Within
British political discourse since the election of Tony Blair and New Labour,
‘disorder’ has become synonymous with ‘anti-social behaviour’. Which begs the
question ‘what is anti-social behaviour’? Since the late 1990s it has been
applied to behaviour that falls just short of conduct considered criminal as
established by law, being described at various times as ‘sub criminal’, ‘low
level crime’ or ‘disorder’ – though it is restricted to public behaviour and characterised
by persistence, or repeated incidences of the conduct (White and Haines, 2008; Croall,
2011). It should also be said that more
or less any behaviour can be deemed anti-social depending on its context and
tolerance level of those subjected thereto (Croall, 2011). Interestingly, as of
2002 the British Crime Survey renamed its ‘list of disorders’ as examples of
‘anti-social behaviour’ (Croall, 2011).
The
Crime and Disorder Act (1998) and Anti-Social Behaviour Act (2003) categorised
‘anti-social behaviour’ as ‘acting in a manner that caused or was likely to
cause harassment, alarm or distress to one or more persons not of the same
household’ – further complicating the balance of context and tolerance (White
and Haines, 2008; McLaughlin and Muncie, 2010), but demonstrating the
entrenchment within a generation of “wildly dysfunctional values” (Dalrymple,
2001).
The
concept of mental disorder is a difficult one to define, as it lacks a
‘consistent operational definition’ that can successfully be franchised to all
situations, as with numerous other medical concepts (Wakefield, 1992; Silver,
2006; Stein, Phillips, Bolton, Fulford, Sadler and Kendler, 2010). The
DSM V proposes the following: “a behavioural or psychological syndrome or
pattern that occurs in an individual…the consequences of which is clinically
significant distress…and that is not
solely a result of social deviance or conflicts with society” (Stein,
Phillips, Bolton, Fulford, Sadler and Kendler, 2010).
When
taking into consideration the additional criterion of “abnormally aggressive or
seriously irresponsible conduct – anti-social behaviour? -” (Mental Health Act, 1983), we find an
‘operational definition’ not so far removed from a criminological perspective.
Kelling
(1981) defined ‘disorder’ as a breach of the community’s expectations of
appropriate social behaviour – i.e. ‘anti-social behaviour’ worthy of moral
contempt and criminal sanction. This
should come as no surprise when we consider that as a Neo-Conservative he would
argue that individual choice and conduct that had social ramifications ought
not to be dealt with according to the liberal theory of ‘moral neutrality’, but
an affirmative moral position (Comfort, 2005; McLaughlin and Muncie, 2008).
The
quotation being discussed in this article, aside from the definition of disorder,
raises two important questions:
1.
Are disorder and crime ‘inextricably linked’ in a sequential process?
2.
Does the affluence of a particular neighbourhood, area, borough etc. act as a
sufficient buffer to this ‘spiral of decline’?
The
relationship between crime and disorder is something that has concerned
humanity throughout its existence, though it is fair to say it is only since
the Enlightenment that an attempt to qualify this has occurred. For
the ancient Greeks, it was simple:Eris
(Ἔρις), the goddess of strife, discord and contention
had a number of daughters (spirits that personified concepts) including Ate (Ἄτη) the spirit of crimes
caused by human recklessness, Dysnomia (Δυσνομία) the spirit of
lawlessness (disorder) and poor civil constitution, and Kakia (Kακία) the
spirit of vice, crime and moral badness (Guirand, 1959). Not only was there a
relationship, but it was an intimate, connected and familial one. Though perhaps purely
anecdotal for the purposes of this essay, its philosophically informative
purpose should not be underestimated.
In ‘Disorder and
Decline: Crime and the Spiral of Decay in American Neighbourhoods’ (Skogan,
1990) it is argued that windows in a building left broken and unrepaired
will inevitably lead to all the rest of the windows being broken (relatively
soon), as an unrepaired broken window represents community indifference,
individual apathy and the sense that no one cares: by extension, breaking more
windows “costs nothing” (- see Wilson and Kelling, 1982; Skogan, 1990, p.49;
Sampson and Raudenbush, 2004).
Ironically,
considering the liberal nature of contemporary Dutch society, Keizer, et al. (2008) of the University of
Groningen carried out a series of controlled experiments to investigate the ‘Broken
Windows’ effect. Several urban locations were selected which were then arranged
and divided into two conditions: ordered and disordered (to suggest they had
begun the ‘spiral of decline’) and at different times. The
researchers then covertly observed the locations to see if people behaved
differently when the environment was disordered. Their results confirmed the
theory and they concluded in support of Wilson and Kelling (1982): disorder and
incivility can indeed encourage criminality (Keizer et al. 2008).
There is much congruence to be found in the
findings of Keizer et al. (2008) and
Skogan’s (1990) conclusions. Skogan argued that the data supported Wilson and
Kelling’s proposition that disorder ought to be taken seriously in all research
on community based crime, and that both play an equally independent as well as
interdependent significant causal role in the decline into community
degradation. Tonry (2009) however, warns of the alleged
dangers posed by continuing with the policing of anti-social behaviour and
policies based on Wilson and Kelling’s hypothesis. He argues that neither of them have realised the
gains their advocates promised, and that they cause more harm than good: resulting in unintended negative
consequences that more than significantly dwarf any benefits that could realistically
be claimed for them. Tonry also argues that the Broken Windows theory
has largely been refuted by the existing empirical research that shows the
initiatives and policy implementations that were informed and influenced by the
hypothesis in the 1990s (specifically in America and with more than a passing
reference to Mayor Giuliani) merit little of the credit for causing the
substantial decline in crime rates. He goes on to suggest that neighbourhood
decline is not exclusively linked to the crime rates, but that ‘underlying economic and levels of crime and disorder already present
were more likely factors (p.589). ’
If this is indeed the case, and underlying
financial issues are the cause of social decline and disorder, then surely
those neighbourhoods undergoing the gentrification process and established
affluent areas should be relatively crime and disorder free?
Sampson and Raudenbush (2004) argue that
disorder, or at least a particular neighbourhood’s perception of it, and thus
the inevitable spiral into decline is much more pronounced in those neighbourhoods with higher proportions of social
disenchantment and disenfranchisement, and are moulded by its socio-economic,
racial and ethnic composition.
The rise of the middle-class has presented social
psychologists, sociologists and criminologists with a number of issues and
controversies relating to the gentrification of urban areas and crime rates
(McLaughlin and Muncie, 2010; Croall, 2011). On the one side we have the argument that
high-income newcomers offer more lucrative targets, suggesting a potential
increase of crime (and therefore an already established area of wealth and expensive possessions would also be seen
similarly), whilst on the other side there is the argument that the more
affluent and financially secure members of the middle class are less inclined to criminal conduct than
those on a low-income, and the displacement of those on
lower incomes being ‘priced out’ would result in
the crime rates decreasing (McDonald, 1986; Tonry, 2009).
McDonald’s (1986) research into the effects of
gentrification on the crime rates of neighbourhoods found that while gentrification can eventually
lead to some decrease in personal crime rates, it has no significant effect on incidences of property crime.
From the initial presentation of Broken Windows, Wilson and Kelling
argued that ‘citizen fear’, created by disorder, lead to compromised social
controls, producing the conditions in which crime can flourish. If Wilson and Kelling are to be taken at the very letter of the
proposition, then we could safely assume that this would be less likely in a
‘nice nieghbourhood’ where people feel a sense of community, know their neighbours and take
pride in the appearance of the community. In a city such as London, the economic strength of the individual
borough councils also have an impact on maintaining the ‘nice’ appearance of the area and in repairing those broken windows before too long (consider
Westminster or Kensington & Chelsea Council’s available resources against
those of say Newham or Tower Hamlets). The question though is not whether crime is prevented by the affluence of
an area, but whether disorder-induced decline is just as likely.
Broken Windows focused principally on the ‘incivilities’ and offensive, disorderly
conduct that made up the conflicting relationships within the many fractured
and relatively deprived communities of America with an “implicit association” between the aforementioned
degraded behaviours and an ‘underclass’ way of life (McLaughlin and Muncie,
2010). One would not expect to find a high enough concentration of the ‘underclasses’ in an affluent neighbourhood to warrant significant
concern over a potential spiral of decline.
If anything can be drawn from the research into
this essay, it is that there is a paucity of empirical
studies, research and literature available delving adequately into the specific impact of ‘broken
windows’ in ‘nice neighbourhoods’.
HM Constabulary are always trying to improve and
‘streamline’ their community-based “quality of life” policing policies – which are both lauded and refuted at times by
the community at large - in the hope of
emulating the success across the pond, in particular that
of New York City Mayor Giuliani’s “Zero-Tolerance Policing” – heavily informed and influenced by Wilson and
Kelling’s “Broken Windows Theory” which shall be summarised below.
Rudolph William Louis "Rudy" Giuliani (Rep)
107th Mayor of New York (1994-2001)
A number
of years following the publication of Broken Windows (1983), Kelling was employed as a New York City Transit
Authority consultant, where
further measures to falsify the broken windows theory were instigated: the
presence of
graffiti was targeted as a ‘public enemy number one’ resulting in a 6year
clean-up of the metro subway system. So
compelling where the results of these measures, and the conviction with which Kelling
professed the theory, that
he also found himself offering his
consultancy services to both the Boston and Los Angeles Police Departments. As
Kelling’s war on subway grafitti came to a close, William
J. Bratton was appointed Chief of the New York City Transit Police (a now
defunct law enforcement agency). Bratton,
having once described Kelling as his "intellectual mentor”, implemented
zero tolerance towards fare-evasion, facilitated the custodial processing
methods and background checks on all those arrested therefor. The Republican Mayor Rudolphe
“Rudy” Giuliani had
Bratton appointed as police commissioner after his election, and Bratton’s Kelling
inspired strategy
was rolled out in a much more pervasive and encompassing manner, within the
rubrics of "quality of life" and "zero tolerance" policing
(Adams, 2006).
William J Bratton CBENew York Police Commissioner (1994-1996)
Influenced
heavily by Broken Windows, the Neo-Conservative Mayor Giuliani’s determination
was, put simply, ideological: the
theory had to be put into action. His intention was to disprove the infamous
and stereotypical New York image of being a veritable Hell’s Kitchen to govern
(Adams, 2006). Bratton
had the police enforce the law with increasing punitiveness against metro fare-evasion, public inebriation, urination,
graffiti “artists” and the notorious ‘squeegee
merchant’ (predominately unemployed, ethnic minorities) that solicits money from drivers after assaulting
unsuspecting car windshields with a cloth and soapy ‘squeegee’.
Initially,
as with the efforts on this side of the Atlantic, Bratton received quite
vociferous criticism for his obsession with misdemeanors and ‘petty crimes’. The
crux of his detractors’ argument being the genetic fallacy that is ‘argumentum ad numerum’ : the
public are more concerned with serious and ‘real’ crime, why concern the NYPD
with "panhandlers, hookers,
or graffiti artists"? But
this just demonstrates that the critics had not truly understood the main
premise of Broken Windows - that
small crimes (or minor disorder) can make way for larger crimes (“real crime”).
Overlook the petty criminal, facilitate
his decline into criminality and their level of criminality might escalate from
petty crimes (misdemeanors) to
more serious offenses (felonies). Bratton's
aim was to attack while
the proverbial iron was still warming up, as it was held that this would
prevent any further escalation of criminal acts in the future (Adams, 2006). If the
2001 Kelling and Sousa study of crime trends in New York is to be believed,
Bratton and Giuliani have been vindicated as rates of both misdemeanor and
felony fell unexpectedly and not insignificantly, and continued to decline for
the following decade.
Independently
of the New York experience under the Law Enforcement trinity of Kelling,
Bratton and Giuliani, researchers at Harvard and Suffolk Universities worked
with local police and law enforcement agencies to identify 34 "crime hot
spots" in Lowell, Middlesex County (Massachusetts) in a study conducted in
2005.
This
study was very similar in nature to that conducted by Keizer et al. (2008), and found similar
results. In 17 of the selected locations
the authorities ensured rubbish collections, repaired street-lighting, enforced
local planning permission and building codes, targeted loiterers,
increased incidences of misdemeanor arrests, and extended mental health
services and support for the homeless. The
other 17 were left as they were, to continue without interruption or
modification (even slightly) to the
standard police operational procedures: the areas that had undergone the
special measures experienced a 20% reduction
in emergency service call outs. The study concluded (in a similar vein to
Keizer et al. (2008) that
cleaning up the physical environment is much more effective than targeting
disorder with criminal sanction,
and that increasing social services had no effect (Braga and Bond, 2005).
It is the contention of the author that crime and disorder are indeed
‘inextricably linked’, though not in any particular order or precedence: each begets the other which facilitates the very existence of both, and
whilst it is less likely that more affluent areas will suffer the spiral of decline quite as
easily, pervasively or as quickly as those less affluent ones, that is not say that such communities
should be complacent.
Broken Windows, it would appear, do need to be repaired quickly before
Eris and her seductive but destructive daughters join the community, affluent
or otherwise.
