On Matters Criminological: The Spiral of Decline

A Downward Spiral of Decline into Disorder

“…at the community level, disorder and crime are usually inextricably linked, in a kind of developmental sequence. ‘Social psychologists and police officers tend to agree that if a window in a building is broken and is left unrepaired, all of the rest of the windows will soon be broken. This is true in nice neighbourhoods as in rundown ones’ (Wilson and Kelling, 1983)”.

The destructive effects of observed disorder and squalid conditions in the environment have been broadly recognised. There are a number of empirical studies that have suggested that insalubrious environments beget morally contemptible behaviours (- see Sampson and Groves 1989; Cohen, Spear, Scribner, Kissinger, Mason and Wildgen, 2000; Sampson and Raudenbush, 2004; Keizer, Lindenburg and Steg, 2008; Tonry, 2009) suggesting that the environment sends potent symbolic messages that both regulate and release individual conduct.

The criminological theory Broken Windows (Wilson and Kelling, 1983) suggests that the pre-eminent indicators of the spiral of decline into criminal degradation are the growth of incivilities and a fanning of the flames of disorder, but not crime itself: wherein lies the implication that areas of high anti-social behaviour is where action is needed most, and from which one would be forgiven for inferring that high crime areas should be considered irredeemable.

Broken Windows was an exploration of urban degeneration (the antithesis of gentrification) that suggested if cultures and climates of disorder were permitted to develop and normalise, then serious crime would grow ‘as certainly as night follows day’ (Wilson and Kelling, 1983; Kelling, 2001; Barton and Kelling, 2006), but Taylor and Covington (1988) found that areas undergoing the gentrification process suffered increasing violence during the transition period (Hughes, 2007).

It is important to bear in mind that the theory was introduced in the 1982 article by the American politico-social scientist and Neo-Conservative ‘eminence grise’ James Q. Wilson – an advisor on crime to President Reagan - and George L. Kelling (a former probation officer turned academic) in the Atlantic Monthly Magazine which is not a criminology journal, and therefore perhaps not written for either an academic or policy audience. Though it has been subject to great debate both within social scientific thought and in the public sphere through policy discourse where there exists a not insignificant corpus of criticism, it has become the sine qua non contribution to the debate on social disorganisation, crime prevention and informal social control backed up by support from several empirical studies. The theory has also been used as an impetus for several reforms in criminal justice policy.  The broken windows theory has also found support from the public health arena: Cohen et al. (2000) found that after controlling for household income, ethnicity, (un)employment rates, and level of education, a high “broken windows index” (such as high incidences of litter, graffiti, public intoxication, rubbish, abandoned cars, and ruined housing) independently predicted neighbourhood gonorrhoea rates (- see Sampson and Raudenbush, 2004).

 James Q Wilson
1931-2012

We must also take care in not being complacent with regards to the implications for, and penetration into social psychology when considering the significance of disorder. As far as social psychologists are concerned, disorder is still a negative concept but carries with it serious and ‘harmful consequences’ for individual health and well-being (Sampson and Raudenbush, 2004).

According to Sampson and Raudenbush (2004) a number of recent studies that they analysed demonstrated that there is a significant correlatory relationship between disorder (as perceived by the community) and physical decline, dysthymia, general psychological distress and helplessness.

Prof. George Kelling

Wilson and Kelling’s (1983) ‘Broken Windows Theory states that the maintenance and monitoring of urban environments in a well-ordered condition can act to stop further vandalism and escalation into a downward spiral of degeneration into more serious crime and increased incidences of ‘disorder’ (Wilson and Kelling, 1983; Kelling, 2001; Barton and Kelling, 2006). It was never meant to be taken as an attempt to cut the Gordian knot, but it was argued that if ‘disorder’ was stamped out, serious crime could be prevented and, a priori, communities would be ‘nicer’, which meant fear of crime would diminish and would result in an increase in informal social controls (Carr, 2007). Lewis and Salem (1986) and Perkins and Taylor (1996) remind us however, that community perception of crime, let alone ‘disorder’, is heterogeneous: dependent on the cultural, social and political resources available (Sampson and Raudenbush, 2004).
But what is disorder if not a Capuletesque take on anti-social behaviour? But then the question must be asked: what is anti-social behaviour? For many of us that attempt to answer this question, we find ourselves in the position of United States Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart attempting to define his ‘threshold test’ for obscenity: I know it when I see it (Jacobellis v. Ohio, 1964).

Justice Potter Stewart
1915-1985
Associate Justice US Supreme Court

Defining disorder has been problematic (Comfort, 2005; Carrabine, Cox, Lee, Plummer, and South, 2009; McLaughlin and Muncie, 2010; Croall, 2011). There exists no less than four distinct and competent operational definitions of disorder coming from discourse political, psychiatric, social, and legal. Though each of these particular definitions are a product of the individual philosophies behind the areas of expertise, that should not suggest that each in turn cannot nor should not be used to mutually inform and edify the other, or even move to create a universally accepted synthetic definition of disorder.
Within British political discourse since the election of Tony Blair and New Labour, ‘disorder’ has become synonymous with ‘anti-social behaviour’. Which begs the question ‘what is anti-social behaviour’? Since the late 1990s it has been applied to behaviour that falls just short of conduct considered criminal as established by law, being described at various times as ‘sub criminal’, ‘low level crime’ or ‘disorder’ – though it is restricted to public behaviour and characterised by persistence, or repeated incidences of the conduct (White and Haines, 2008; Croall, 2011).  It should also be said that more or less any behaviour can be deemed anti-social depending on its context and tolerance level of those subjected thereto (Croall, 2011). Interestingly, as of 2002 the British Crime Survey renamed its ‘list of disorders’ as examples of ‘anti-social behaviour’ (Croall, 2011).

The Crime and Disorder Act (1998) and Anti-Social Behaviour Act (2003) categorised ‘anti-social behaviour’ as ‘acting in a manner that caused or was likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress to one or more persons not of the same household’ – further complicating the balance of context and tolerance (White and Haines, 2008; McLaughlin and Muncie, 2010), but demonstrating the entrenchment within a generation of “wildly dysfunctional values” (Dalrymple, 2001).

 The concept of mental disorder is a difficult one to define, as it lacks a ‘consistent operational definition’ that can successfully be franchised to all situations, as with numerous other medical concepts (Wakefield, 1992; Silver, 2006; Stein, Phillips, Bolton, Fulford, Sadler and Kendler, 2010). The DSM V proposes the following: “a behavioural or psychological syndrome or pattern that occurs in an individual…the consequences of which is clinically significant distress…and that is not solely a result of social deviance or conflicts with society” (Stein, Phillips, Bolton, Fulford, Sadler and Kendler, 2010).

 When taking into consideration the additional criterion of “abnormally aggressive or seriously irresponsible conduct – anti-social behaviour? -” (Mental Health Act, 1983), we find an ‘operational definition’ not so far removed from a criminological perspective.

Kelling (1981) defined ‘disorder’ as a breach of the community’s expectations of appropriate social behaviour – i.e. ‘anti-social behaviour’ worthy of moral contempt and criminal sanction. This should come as no surprise when we consider that as a Neo-Conservative he would argue that individual choice and conduct that had social ramifications ought not to be dealt with according to the liberal theory of ‘moral neutrality’, but an affirmative moral position (Comfort, 2005; McLaughlin and Muncie, 2008).

The quotation being discussed in this article, aside from the definition of disorder, raises two important questions:

1. Are disorder and crime ‘inextricably linked’ in a sequential process?

2. Does the affluence of a particular neighbourhood, area, borough etc. act as a sufficient buffer to this ‘spiral of decline’? 

The relationship between crime and disorder is something that has concerned humanity throughout its existence, though it is fair to say it is only since the Enlightenment that an attempt to qualify this has occurred. For the ancient Greeks, it was simple:
Eris (Ἔρις), the goddess of strife, discord and contention had a number of daughters (spirits that personified concepts) including Ate (Ἄτη) the spirit of crimes caused by human recklessness, Dysnomia (Δυσνομία) the spirit of lawlessness (disorder) and poor civil constitution, and Kakia (Kακία) the spirit of vice, crime and moral badness (Guirand, 1959). Not only was there a relationship, but it was an intimate, connected and familial one. Though perhaps purely anecdotal for the purposes of this essay, its philosophically informative purpose should not be underestimated.

In ‘Disorder and Decline: Crime and the Spiral of Decay in American Neighbourhoods’ (Skogan, 1990) it is argued that windows in a building left broken and unrepaired will inevitably lead to all the rest of the windows being broken (relatively soon), as an unrepaired broken window represents community indifference, individual apathy and the sense that no one cares: by extension, breaking more windows “costs nothing” (- see Wilson and Kelling, 1982; Skogan, 1990, p.49; Sampson and Raudenbush, 2004).

Ironically, considering the liberal nature of contemporary Dutch society, Keizer, et al. (2008) of the University of Groningen carried out a series of controlled experiments to investigate the ‘Broken Windows’ effect. Several urban locations were selected which were then arranged and divided into two conditions: ordered and disordered (to suggest they had begun the ‘spiral of decline’) and at different times. The researchers then covertly observed the locations to see if people behaved differently when the environment was disordered. Their results confirmed the theory and they concluded in support of Wilson and Kelling (1982): disorder and incivility can indeed encourage criminality (Keizer et al. 2008).

 There is much congruence to be found in the findings of Keizer et al. (2008) and Skogan’s (1990) conclusions. Skogan argued that the data supported Wilson and Kelling’s proposition that disorder ought to be taken seriously in all research on community based crime, and that both play an equally independent as well as interdependent significant causal role in the decline into community degradation.  Tonry (2009) however, warns of the alleged dangers posed by continuing with the policing of anti-social behaviour and policies based on Wilson and Kelling’s hypothesis. He argues that neither of them have realised the gains their advocates promised, and that they cause more harm than good: resulting in unintended negative consequences that more than significantly dwarf any benefits that could realistically be claimed for them. Tonry also argues that the Broken Windows theory has largely been refuted by the existing empirical research that shows the initiatives and policy implementations that were informed and influenced by the hypothesis in the 1990s (specifically in America and with more than a passing reference to Mayor Giuliani) merit little of the credit for causing the substantial decline in crime rates. He goes on to suggest that neighbourhood decline is not exclusively linked to the crime rates,  but that ‘underlying economic and levels of crime and disorder already present were more likely factors (p.589). ’ 
 If this is indeed the case, and underlying financial issues are the cause of social decline and disorder, then surely those neighbourhoods undergoing the gentrification process and established affluent areas should be relatively crime and disorder free?

Sampson and Raudenbush (2004) argue that disorder, or at least a particular neighbourhood’s perception of it, and thus the inevitable spiral into decline is much more pronounced in those neighbourhoods with higher proportions of social disenchantment and disenfranchisement, and are moulded by its socio-economic, racial and ethnic composition.

The rise of the middle-class has presented social psychologists, sociologists and criminologists with a number of issues and controversies relating to the gentrification of urban areas and crime rates (McLaughlin and Muncie, 2010; Croall, 2011).  On the one side we have the argument that high-income newcomers offer more lucrative targets, suggesting a potential increase of crime (and therefore an already established area of wealth and expensive possessions would also be seen similarly), whilst on the other side there is the argument that the more affluent and financially secure members of the middle class are less inclined to criminal conduct than those on a low-income, and the displacement of those on

 lower incomes being ‘priced out’ would result in the crime rates decreasing (McDonald, 1986; Tonry, 2009). 

McDonald’s (1986) research into the effects of gentrification on the crime rates of neighbourhoods found that while gentrification can eventually lead to some decrease in personal crime rates, it has no significant effect on incidences of property crime.

From the initial presentation of Broken Windows, Wilson and Kelling argued that ‘citizen fear’, created by disorder, lead to compromised social controls, producing the conditions in which crime can flourish. If Wilson and Kelling are to be taken at the very letter of the proposition, then we could safely assume that this would be less likely in a ‘nice nieghbourhood’ where people feel a sense of community, know their neighbours and take pride in the appearance of the community. In a city such as London, the economic strength of the individual borough councils also have an impact on maintaining the ‘nice’ appearance of the area and in repairing those broken windows before too long (consider Westminster or Kensington & Chelsea Council’s available resources against those of say Newham or Tower Hamlets). The question though is not whether crime is prevented by the affluence of an area, but whether disorder-induced decline is just as likely.

Broken Windows focused principally on the ‘incivilities’ and offensive, disorderly conduct that made up the conflicting relationships within the many fractured and relatively deprived communities of America with an “implicit association” between the aforementioned degraded behaviours and an ‘underclass’ way of life (McLaughlin and Muncie, 2010). One would not expect to find a high enough concentration of the ‘underclasses’ in an affluent neighbourhood to warrant significant concern over a potential spiral of decline. 

If anything can be drawn from the research into this essay, it is that there is a paucity of empirical studies, research and literature available delving adequately into the specific impact of ‘broken windows’ in ‘nice neighbourhoods’.

HM Constabulary are always trying to improve and ‘streamline’ their community-based “quality of life” policing policies – which are both lauded and refuted at times by the community at large -  in the hope of emulating the success across the pond, in particular that of New York City Mayor Giuliani’s “Zero-Tolerance Policing” – heavily informed and influenced by Wilson and Kelling’s “Broken Windows Theory” which shall be summarised below.

Rudolph William Louis "Rudy" Giuliani (Rep)
107th Mayor of New York (1994-2001)

  A number of years following the publication of Broken Windows (1983), Kelling was employed as a New York City Transit Authority consultant, where further measures to falsify the broken windows theory were instigated: the presence of graffiti was targeted as a ‘public enemy number one’ resulting in a 6year clean-up of the metro subway system. So compelling where the results of these measures, and the conviction with which Kelling professed the theory, that he  also found himself offering his consultancy services to both the Boston and Los Angeles Police Departments. As Kelling’s war on subway grafitti came to a close, William J. Bratton was appointed Chief of the New York City Transit Police (a now defunct law enforcement agency). Bratton, having once described Kelling as his "intellectual mentor”, implemented zero tolerance towards fare-evasion, facilitated the custodial processing methods and background checks on all those arrested therefor. The Republican Mayor Rudolphe “Rudy” Giuliani had Bratton appointed as police commissioner after his election, and Bratton’s Kelling inspired strategy was rolled out in a much more pervasive and encompassing manner, within the rubrics of "quality of life" and "zero tolerance" policing (Adams, 2006). 

William J Bratton CBE
New York Police Commissioner (1994-1996)

Influenced heavily by Broken Windows, the Neo-Conservative Mayor Giuliani’s determination was, put simply, ideological: the theory had to be put into action. His intention was to disprove the infamous and stereotypical New York image of being a veritable Hell’s Kitchen to govern (Adams, 2006). Bratton had the police enforce the law with increasing punitiveness against metro fare-evasion, public inebriation, urination, graffiti “artists” and the notorious ‘squeegee merchant’ (predominately unemployed, ethnic minorities) that solicits money from drivers after assaulting unsuspecting car windshields with a cloth and soapy ‘squeegee’.

Initially, as with the efforts on this side of the Atlantic, Bratton received quite vociferous criticism for his obsession with misdemeanors and ‘petty crimes’. The crux of his detractors’ argument being the genetic fallacy that is ‘argumentum ad numerum’ : the public are more concerned with serious and ‘real’ crime, why concern the NYPD with "panhandlers, hookers, or graffiti artists"? But this just demonstrates that the critics had not truly understood the main premise of Broken Windows - that small crimes (or minor disorder) can make way for larger crimes (“real crime”). Overlook the petty criminal, facilitate his decline into criminality and their level of criminality might escalate from petty crimes (misdemeanors) to more serious offenses (felonies).  Bratton's aim was to attack while the proverbial iron was still warming up, as it was held that this would prevent any further escalation of criminal acts in the future (Adams, 2006). If the 2001 Kelling and Sousa study of crime trends in New York is to be believed, Bratton and Giuliani have been vindicated as rates of both misdemeanor and felony fell unexpectedly and not insignificantly, and continued to decline for the following decade. 
Independently of the New York experience under the Law Enforcement trinity of Kelling, Bratton and Giuliani, researchers at Harvard and Suffolk Universities worked with local police and law enforcement agencies to identify 34 "crime hot spots" in Lowell, Middlesex County (Massachusetts) in a study conducted in 2005.

This study was very similar in nature to that conducted by Keizer et al. (2008), and found similar results. In 17 of the selected locations the authorities ensured rubbish collections, repaired street-lighting, enforced local planning permission and building codes, targeted loiterers, increased incidences of misdemeanor arrests, and extended mental health services and support for the homeless. The other 17 were left as they were, to continue without interruption or modification (even slightly) to the standard police operational procedures: the areas that had undergone the special measures experienced a 20% reduction in emergency service call outs. The study concluded (in a similar vein to Keizer et al. (2008) that cleaning up the physical environment is much more effective than targeting disorder with criminal sanction, and that increasing social services had no effect (Braga and Bond, 2005).
It is the contention of the author that crime and disorder are indeed ‘inextricably linked’, though not in any particular order or precedence: each begets the other which facilitates the very existence of both, and whilst it is less likely that more affluent areas will suffer the spiral of decline quite as easily, pervasively or as quickly as those less affluent ones, that is not say that such communities should be complacent.

Broken Windows, it would appear, do need to be repaired quickly before Eris and her seductive but destructive daughters join the community, affluent or otherwise.