On Matters Criminological: When Big Brother came to Britain - has UK become a 'pan-optic' surveillance society?

"He who is subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, assumes responsibility for the constraints of power...he becomes the principle of his own subjection"

(Michel Foucault)

Michel Foucault’s (1975) social theory of ‘Panopticism’ was originally developed in his book, “Surveillir et Punir” (translated into English as ‘Discipline and Punish’ not, interestingly, as Survey and Punish). In Discipline and Punish, Foucault expands on Jeremy Bentham's conceptualization of the panopticon: the circular building with an observation tower in the centre of an open space surrounded by an outer wall containing cells for occupants (for example, inmates in a prison).

The motivation behind the design was an increase in security facilitated by more effective surveillance. Residing within cells flooded with light, occupants are readily distinguishable and visible to a guard "invisibly" positioned in the central tower. Conversely, occupants are invisible to each other, with concrete walls dividing their cells. Foucault elaborated upon the function of disciplinary mechanisms in the prison and illustrated the function of discipline as an apparatus of power. The "panoptic" style of architecture may also be franchised to other institutions with surveillance needs, such as schools, factories, or hospitals forming the ‘carceral archipelago’ (Foucault, 1975). The ever-visible inmate, Foucault suggests, is always "the object of information, never a subject in communication" (Foucault, 1995 p195-228).

In the developed (and in parts of the developing world) surveillance societies have started to emerge. Surveillance societies are societies which function, in part, because of the extensive collection, recording, storage, analysis and application of information on individuals and groups in those societies as they go about their lives through the deployment of a variety of ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ technologies involving intelligence gathering by means ranging from the more traditional (such as informants and collaborators, wiretapping – both of which were perfected by the Stasi - direct observation and territorial mapping) to the more technologically “cutting edge developments” - categorical sorting, database cross-referencing, behavioural profiling, ever sophisticated electronic identification systems from internet filtering, CCTV, GPS, biometric chips, iris scanning, and radio frequency identification to name but a few (Ball and Webster, 2003: Gray, 2003; Jamieson, 2009; Kosekla, 2003; Tierney, 2010; Kampfner, 2012).






Whilst it may be true that developments in various forms of surveillance in the UK that began under New Labour as we approached the new millennium have stimulated much research and debate amongst journalists, human rights organisations and academic criminologists, as well as influence policy and political discourse (Tierney, 2010), can 21st century British society really be classed as a ‘pan-optic surveillance society’?

Yes: there are an estimated 5 million CCTV cameras currently in use in the UK, a greater number than in any other sovereign nation in the world(Tierney, 2010; Kampfner, 2012).
Cameras are increasingly incorporating automatic number plate recognition (ANPR), which in the near future will allow all road vehicle journeys to be tracked, recorded and held for up to five years (Tierney, 2010). In addition, many CCTV cameras include facial recognition technology. Transport for London (TfL) ‘Oyster’ cards record details of journeys made, and this information can be requested by authorised agencies (Gray, 2003; Tierney, 2010). Let us not forget retail and commercial complicity in the surveillance society: Loyalty cards, bonus cards, store cards. All of these track consumer choice and habit, offer us rewards and points when certain products are purchased, but also keep a record of what was purchased, where, when and by whom (Ball and Webster, 2003; Garland, 2001; Lyon 2001; Tierney, 2010; Travis, 2010).

Foucault, as well as others, believed that in addition to its obvious function of identifying and capturing individuals committing undesirable acts, surveillance could function in a way that created the feeling of always being watched, so that individuals (and communities) became self-policing: facilitating State control of the populace without resorting to brute force, which is expensive and otherwise problematic (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982; Foucault, 1975; Wood, 2003; Yar, 2003). Fundamental to Foucault’s panopticism is the systematic ordering and controlling of (general and problem) populations through subtle and often ‘invisible’ forces. Such ordering is apparent in many parts of the modernised and increasingly digitalised world of the information age. Contemporary advancements in technology and surveillance techniques have perhaps made Foucault’s theories increasingly pertinent to any scrutiny of the relationship between the state and its population (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982; Simon, 2003; Wood, 2003; Yar, 2003).

But how does all this surveillance improve, or benefit society, if at all? A sense of security? Are ‘Situational Crime Prevention mechanisms’ effective? What of the right to privacy and other human rights and state protections (not to mention that of ‘from the State’)?

“If you are not doing anything you should not be, you have got nothing to worry about”.
While this may be an overwhelmingly naïve statement, it does underlie the justifications issued by those with a vested interest in surveillance. We also have to ask ourselves not just “how many convictions have arisen through the use of CCTV” but also “how many acquittals have arisen through the use of CCTV and other surveillance mechanisms?” There is no question that surveillance technology is a valuable tool in the detection and investigation of crime at the disposal of the police: a number of murders have been solved because they could show that the murderer was near where the victim was picked up or where the body was dumped (Rowlatt, 2008).

Even though nearly half of all metropolitan and non-metropolitan councils had already installed CCTV within their inner-urban areas by the mid 1990s, very few of these systems had been exposed to any form of systematic evaluation (see Boys-Smith’s forward in Brown, 1995). According to the Brown (1995) study for the Home Office, there was a growing sense of concern at the paucity of evaluation, especially amongst those retailers who had significantly contributed to the financing of these systems.

Results from previous studies published by the Home Office indicate that CCTV can, in certain circumstances, make a “useful contribution to crime control”. Brown’s (1995) study for the Home Office established that cameras were most commonly used to tackle conspicuous anti-social and criminal behavior ranging from nuisance behaviour to assaults and woundings. Also of note was the significant minority of cases in which the camera systems have led to arrests for other offences such as burglary, car crime, robbery and murder.

But what of CCTV impact on crime? In the short term, when cameras are first installed within an area, they can have strong deterrent effects on a wide range of crimes resulting in a reduction in local crime. However, this effect may start to weaken in the longer term (Brown, 1995). For this reason its advocates argue that in order to sustain the effect of cameras on a particular offence, the cameras must be used to increase the risk of arrest for offenders (Brown, 1995; Ditton, 2000; Kelly, Caputo and Jamieson, 2005).


“Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?”
(Decimus Iunius “Juvenal” Iuvenalis , Satire VI, lines 347–8)

Critics may argue, as did Juvenal in his Satire VI, that not only is it impossible to enforce moral behavior when the enforcers are corruptible (Clausen, 1992), but also that surveillance begets distrust in those who wield it. Its focus on correcting the negative and message to those under surveillance that they are not trusted to behave according to the social norms of conduct could be seen as detrimental to the social fabric (Gellately, 1990; Hier, 2003; Fyfe, 2004; Meier, 2004).

However, while on one hand, new technologies, such as CCTV or other surveillance cameras, have shown the continued utility of "panoptic" mechanisms in liberal democracies, it could also be argued that electronic surveillance technologies are unnecessary in the original "organic" or "geometric" disciplinary mechanisms as illustrated by Foucault (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982; Simon, 2003; Wood, 2003; Yar, 2003). Foucault argues, for instance, that Jeremy Bentham's Panopticon provides us with a model in which a self-disciplined society has been able to develop. The paraphernalia of social control are vital if we are to govern ourselves, without a constant and pervasive surveillance and intervention into every aspect of our lives (Foucault, 1975; Gellately, 1990; Simon, 2003; Wood, 2003; Yar, 2003). The historian Robert Gellately (1990) has observed, for instance, that because of the widespread willingness of Germans to inform on each other to the Gestapo (and later to the Stasi in German Democratic Republic) that Germany between 1933 and 1990 was a prime example of Panopticism (Gellately, 1990; Funder, 2003; Molloy, 2009).

It is also open to abuses of the most prima facie ridiculousness: Councils have used anti-terrorism powers under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIP) to spy on households suspected of various misdemeanours and summary offences from unburied animal carcasses, unlicensed petrol storage, non-quarantine of a domestic pet through to identification of an alleged bogus faith healer (Rayner, 2008; Willis, 2009).

Bentham's inmates were aware that they were being watched by the guards, though each prisoner remained isolated from all the other prisoners. The modern panopticon is a reversal of his original: the guards are hidden from our view and consciousness, and not only are we aware of the other prisoners but we are also encouraged to connect to them in as many (traceable) ways as possible (Garland, 2001; Mann, Fung, Federman, and Baccanico, 2003; Simon, 2003; Wood, 2003; Yar, 2003).

Surveillance has been used by authoritarian regimes (national and colonial) throughout history, albeit through different mechanisms and methods. It became rampant as the "security state" grew and the legitimacy of those ruling authorities crumbled. Thus, an analysis comparing surveillance mechanisms adopted by authoritarian/colonial rule might be prudent in the interest of refreshing society’s and politicians’ memories (Cohen, 1985; Funder, 2003; Parenti, 2003; Molloy, 2004; Dixon, 2006).

It is my contention that whilst we may as a society be uncomfortable with and deplore the ever pervasive nature of government surveillance of our daily lives in the interest of security and safety, we must be careful in our implied philosophical flirtations with the adjective ‘Orwellian’ - official deception, secret surveillance, and manipulation of the past by a totalitarian state (Drabble, 2006; Jamieson, 2009), for the reason that whatever your feelings on the establishment and political élite are, we do not live in the GDR under threat of the State Security Police, China or the USSR policed by the Ministry of State Security and Committee for State Security (KGB)respectively (Funder, 2003; Molloy, 2004).

"He who is subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, assumes responsibility for the constraints of power...he becomes the principle of his own subjection"
(Michel Foucault)