On Matters Cultural: Recipes from the 'Tjwizin Kwéyòl' (Créole Kitchen)

POULÉ KAKWÉT
(Peanut Chicken)

This particular dish can be found in as many variations as there Créole nations, and its African heritage is demonstrated by its presence in the cuisines of a number of West African cultures (My Aunt Jocelyne makes a really tasty version from the Côte d'Ivoire). Though chicken is the most common variant, it can be replaced equally convincingly by pork, prawns or fish... 

(No measurements or concrete cooking times are provided, as when I cook everything is done through informed estimation... and I have no idea how hungry you are when you decide to make the dish)

INGREDIENTS
Olive oil
Onions
Chicken fillets, cubed
Carrots, washed peeled and quartered

Peanut butter (smooth)
Can of coconut milk
"Sent Twinité" spice blend
Liquid seasoning
Bay leaves
Créole pepper sauces

SENT TWINITÉ SPICE BLENDBlack or Cayenne Pepper
Garlic Powder
Salt
*not the traditional Créole 'Holy Trinity'

LIQUID SEASONINGWorcestershire Sauce (only Lea & Perrins cuts it)*
Maggi Sauce "Liquid seasoning"*
(Dark) Soy Sauce
* personal preference is a mix of both

BASIC PROCEDURE
1. season the chicken in the Sent Twinité spice blend, and set aside.
2. chop onions as desired, fry over a medium flame in a decent amount of oil and season with the Sent Twinité blend, Créole pepper sauce and liquid seasoning.
3. add chicken and brown.
4. once chicken has browned, add the coconut milk and carrots, mixing from time to time...ensuring an even cooking process.
5. once the milk has started to boil, lower the flame and mix in the peanut butter to taste/desired consistency.
6. add a dash of liquid seasoning, and a small hand full of bay leaves: leave to infuse for about 10 mins whilst on a medium heat.

SERVING SUGGESTION*Sweet Potato and Corriander Mash
*Diwi Kòkò (Coconut Rice)
*Salad Tòmat (Tomato Salad)
*Fried Plantain topped with melted cheese and spiced guava jelly

On Matters Legal: Rebalancing the Scales - Public Opinion and Jury Competence. A Research Proposal

“...trial by jury is more than an instrument of justice and more than one wheel of the constitution: it is the lamp that shows that freedom lives.”
(Patrick Arthur, Lord Devlin PC)

The ultimate credibility of the British legal convention that is the presumption of ‘innocent until proven guilty’ lies in the very nature and attendance of the jury, creating a judicial transubstantiation of ‘mere slogan’ into ‘real presence’ (Devlin, 1956; Hitchens, 2003). The authority of the jury and its resilience to political attack, interference and perversion – which has been increasingly curbed since the 1960s - lies not in any codified constitutional document (though many incorrectly cite Magna Carta), as in jurisdictions such as France, Canada and the USA, but in ancient custom making it vulnerable to attack on grounds of competence, cost, confidentiality and consumption of court time (Darbyshire, 1991; Darbyshire, Maughan and Stuart, 2002; Erastus-Obilo, 2009; Hitchens, 2003; Thomas, 2010).

Though public confidence has historically erred on the side of favour - and at times heated defence - of its existence, cases in recent memory and others viewed in hindsight have raised many questions about the competence of a given jury and reignited the debate on whether the Justice System is indeed ‘fit for purpose’, casting doubt on the legitimacy of the prohibition on empirical research into the very area that would resolve those issues (Jackson, 1996) and if Lord Devlin’s lamp that bears witness to the freedom of our society is, as Darbyshire suggested, “really worth the candle”? (Banks, 2012; Darbyshire, 1991; Hitchens, 2003; Padfield, 2008).

LITERATURE REVIEW

The jury as an institution has at times come under attack from both the fires of ideologically motivated government policy interventions parading as ‘reform’, such as the introduction of majority verdicts and the abolition of qualification based on (psychological) maturity,( level of) education and (degree of) responsibility and of the ‘rebalancing’ and ‘modernising’ of the criminal justice system, such as the July 2002 White Paper following Lord Justice Auld’s recommendations including the abolition of the right to trial by jury and a law to definitively establish that no jury has the right to acquit a defendant “in defiance of the law or in disregard of the evidence” (Auld, 2001; Hitchens, 2003 p200; Zander, 2001).

Our knowledge of how juries come to their verdicts and the nature of their deliberations - including what has been used to direct and influence their decisions - is sparse and at best ‘informed guesswork’ (Padfield, 2008). While the paucity of research into this area is both understandable (see s.8 Contempt of Court Act 1981) and academically frustrating, those that advocate lifting the proverbial veil from obscuring public scrutiny find an ugly reality check in the words of Prof. Sir John Smith (1998, p 105) in his damning with faint praise of the jury system and the fact that much of public opinion is based on (potentially ill founded) assumption.

Smith (1998) concedes that holding up the jury system and its deliberation processes to public scrutiny may be philosophically desirable, but warns that we risk further undermining public confidence in the jury in so doing: at what price would this come? What impact would be felt by learning that things which in the cold light of day would be deemed as legally inconsequential and ethically unsound were what swayed the jury to acquit a defendant for whose blood the public had been vociferously baying outside of the court (Padfield, 2008; Smith, 1998)?

Concerns and ideological criticisms aside, that there is a credible need for more research into the inner workings of the jury room and the psychology of ‘the jury’ is not the academic (and at times legal) bone of contention; it is the nature, scope and focus of the research. Investigations into the competence of the jury are important not just when dealing with matters criminal as they also have the task of establishing liability and setting remuneration in certain civil and financial cases, although the replacement of the jury with a panel of experts (judicial and financial) is occurring more often because of concerns raised from within the legal profession, the Bar and the Bench (Levi, 1993; Padfield, 2008; Erastus-Obilo, 2009).

Sanders, Young and Burton (2010) argue that even though s.8 of the Contempt of Court Act (1981) is lauded by many for its role in protecting the individual members of the jury from threat of retaliation and preserving the finality of their verdicts, its actual purpose was to “preserve public confidence in regard to the adjudication of issues of fact” (Jaconelli, 2002; Sanders et al.,2010).

But can we be sure that it has successfully done that? Sanders et al (2010) ask an even more interesting question that is inextricably linked with the issue of public confidence vis-à-vis the jury: do juries deserve public confidence? It is suggested that the right questions are not being asked and any systematic observational (direct or indirect) research has been greatly impeded by an all-encompassing preoccupation with protecting the secrecy of the jury which, until the Contempt of Court Act , existed only in legal convention as the precise legal position was less than clear.

What we know of the jury is that their deliberations are conducted in private, and they are under no statutory obligation to qualify the verdict they return. This, suggests Sanders et al, ought to be considered in the discourse surrounding jury competence, comprehension and public opinion. The question of the jury deserving public confidence is as equivocal as that of their competence.  Any attempt to ‘obtain, disclose or solicit...opinions expressed, arguments advanced...in the course of their deliberation’ will result in the researcher being found in breach of s.8 and in ‘contempt of court’, but without such research or investigation, how can we be sure that the juries set aside their prejudices, seek hard evidence of guilt, and apply the appropriate standard of proof?

Individual juror prejudice, discrimination or bias provides not just an a priori impediment to carrying out its role of representing society, and injecting what Lord Birkett (1958) described as “ordinary standards of common decency” into the judicial process as, he continued, “…the jury introduces into the law an element of community sentiment and fairness: a jury can do justice where a judge ... has to follow the law…” (Birkett, 1958; Jackson 1996, p.340) and thereby bringing the entire system into disgrace, but it can also flavour the style and substance of the deliberations and by extension the resulting verdict (Jackson, 1996).

The issue of jury comprehension is especially important within an adversarial system where the scales of justice are tipped in favour of what can be proved against what actually happened (Sanders et al, 2010). The barrister’s primary duty is to win, not ‘seek truth’: even if that involves resorting to the ugly reality of socially accepted – and lazy – stereotypes, or bombarding the witnesses with loaded questions designed to confuse, intimidate, lead or trap. Consider the barristers understanding of linguistic and grammatical rules governing double negatives or multiple-clause questions and that of the average member of the public, and its impact on their deliberations.

It is within this context that this study finds its philosophical motivation.  By focusing on the public’s perceptions of the jury’s competence and credibility, whether or not the assumptions held are of any truth, it may be possible to identify causal links between certain factors and variables that might improve public confidence in the jury without finding oneself in breach of the Contempt of Court Act (1981) and the lugubrious waters of criminal responsibility. As the jury is made up of members of the public, who previous to and following their jury service will constitute part of the ‘public’ to whom the study makes reference in regards to competence and legitimacy, it was felt that the public themselves were the most appropriate and pertinent subject of study.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS/HYPOTHESES

The main aims and objectives of the study are to investigate and seek to establish whether the education of ‘sworn jurors’ in areas such as i) the legal process ii) basic civil/criminal law iii) civil/criminal justice procedure and iv) police process under statutory provision and regulation by an appropriate academic body would increase public confidence in the wider British Justice system.

Given the sensitive nature of discussions of and investigations into the jury, and the hurdles of silence and secrecy notwithstanding, this particular study seeks to bypass all of that by focusing specifically on the public perception of the jury’s competence to deliberate rather than the actual deliberations themselves,  and the potential perceived impact and ramifications that educating a jury would have on public opinion and confidence in ‘trial by jury’ and the British adversarial justice system.

It was important that this study was approached from the right position. As the existing literature was reviewed, a number of questions presented themselves quite naturally. Each question stood independently but was also inextricably linked with the others. It was evident from the very beginning that whilst there is no lack of academic interest in the workings of the jury, there was an embarrassing paucity of research concerned with the public and its attitudes thereto.

• ·         Is a panel of twelve ‘peers’ selected at random and without qualification from the electoral register competent to act as ‘sole arbiter of fact’

• ·         What can be done to improve public opinion of and increase public confidence in the jury?

• ·         Would the statutory education and training of jurors increase public confidence in the British adversarial justice system and ‘trial by jury’?

 METHODOLOGY

Dealing with the concept of ‘public perception and opinion’ of an independent body within the institution that is the ‘British Justice System’ , this study falls squarely within the remit of constructivist ontological research (Bryman, 2008; Robson, 2011).

The method of data collection for which it was deemed most appropriate to opt was the ‘questionnaire’. Questionnaires make information gathering relatively quick, although under certain circumstances designing the questionnaire can be as time consuming as its application and analysis. Questionnaires present themselves as one of the most objective methods, as they permit the responses to be collected in a reasonably standardised manner (Carter and Williamson, 1996; Foddy, 1994; McColl, Jacoby, Thomas, Soutter, Bamford, Steen, Thomas, Harvey, Garratt and Bond, 2001; Milne, 1999; Neuman, 2005).

At the same time, it is recognised that a disadvantage of this method is that if the questionnaire seems to be too time consuming the study participants may provide superficial answers so as simply to complete it. Further to this, participants may not have reservations or concerns about the questions themselves and not be willing to answer them: this could be due to concerns in revealing certain information, or that should they answer a question in a particular way (honestly, for example) they might face penalisation (Carter and Williamson, 1996; Coolican, 2009; Foddy, 1994; Milne, 1999).

A further accepted weakness common to questionnaires is the lack of scope in probing the responses. By their very nature, questionnaires are controlled. They provide for little elasticity in the manner that participants may respond which impedes qualification of answers, if the participant felt it so necessary. This design flaw can be partially overcome by providing space for qualification and comment – though this would increase the amount of time taken to complete the questionnaire. Comments are among the most helpful of all the information on the questionnaire, and they usually provide insightful information that would have otherwise been lost (Carter and Williamson, 1996; Coolican, 2009; Foddy, 1994; McColl et al, 2001; Milne, 1999; Neuman, 2005).

To overcome these issues, it would be prudent to pilot the questionnaire on a smaller group of friends or colleagues to generate feedback on how to improve upon it. Study participants would also receive a complete briefing before they began: told why the information was being collected and how the results would be beneficial and how they would be used, that they should answer honestly and sincerely even in the event that their response was negative, as this is equally as constructive as a more positive response. Participants will also be assured of the anonymity of their participation (Carter and Williamson, 1996; Coolican, 2009; Foddy, 1994; Milne, 1999; Neuman, 2005).

In order for the questionnaire to provide the best results, the questions selected must be carefully thought through. In order to find any significant correlation between public opinion, the competence of the jury and the British justice system, questions would need to be asked on each of the three areas. In order to be as faithful as possible to their positions, thoughts, opinions and feelings and to give a reasonable amount of flexibility, the participants would be offered a framework within which to respond: the participants would be presented with a series of written statements, and a scale of 1 – 5 with boxes to tick to identify their position and space to qualify the answer if necessary.

 e.g.  ‘Trial by Jury’ is an important part of the British Justice System

       1 ⊠ DISAGREE STRONGLY

       2 ⊠ DISAGREE

       3 ⊠ NO VIEW/INDIFFERENT
       4 ⊠ AGREE

       5 ⊠ AGREE STRONGLY

       Comment:...............................................................................................................................................................

ACCESS

Accessing a sample group consisting of serving or former jurors for the purposes of social research relating to their competence would be both potentially insulting and a breach of s.8 CCA (1981) that could result in some form of criminal responsibility or judicial sanction, not to mention logistically difficult. However as the subject of this particular study is public opinion, and by extension perception of competence, this is not an issue.

In fact quite the opposite: access to the preferred sampling group in this study is relatively easy to obtain:

• ·         Access to the university campus is guaranteed

• ·         Appropriate location is available

• ·         Significant numbers of potential participants are available

Permission of course would need to be secured from the lecturers whose students were being used as participants, as it would be in their time that the students would be approached – to facilitate distribution and collection of the questionnaires.

For reasons of logistical convenience and likelihood of finding respondents, the sample group will be 2^nd year undergraduate 'Faculty of Arts and Human Sciences' students (or equivalent) at an inner-London University.

SAMPLING.

The heterogeneous make up of the student body of an inner-London university, with its blend of national and international, mature and non-mature students from across the socio-economic and philosophical spectrum presents itself as the most natural population from which to draw a purposive sampling group. 

As the jury is supposed to represent a cross-section of the public according to a set of criteria as established by statute (Sanders et al, 2010), it is against these same criteria that the sample group would be selected, that is to say:

• ·         Registered electors aged 18 to 70 (Including the Republic of Ireland and Commonwealth countries)

• ·         Resident in the UK for at least 5 years since age 13

• ·         Not deemed mentally disordered

• ·         Not having been in prison or youth custody for any amount of time within the last 10 years

• ·         Not having been in prison or youth custody for more than 5 years (at all)

(Juries Act 1974, s.1, as amended by Criminal Justice Act 2003 s.321/ Sch.33)

·        

• Not having previous experience of jury service

• ·         Not having served, or currently serving as a Magistrate

For the purposes of this study only it was felt that no previous engagement in a judicial/court based public service capacity would help to preserve the ‘assumptive’ nature and foundation of the sample group’s opinions.

ETHICS

The questionnaire format can be used to explore contentious and deeply personal areas, opinions and sentiments more easily than other methods through its anonymity and potential to be completed in total privacy. This naturally increases the likelihood of participants completing the questionnaire honestly, as they feel no intimidation from a researcher being present (Carter and Williamson, 1996; Milne, 1999; Neuman, 2005).

Complete anonymity will be provided for all participants: no form of identification other than a numerical reference for data analysis will be present anywhere in the study’s documentation. This removes completely the likelihood that identifiable data would be shared with other researchers, prevents any breach of the ‘duty of confidentiality’ (BCS, 2006), and makes impossible the transfer of identifiable data to any third parties with or without the participants’ consent.

Participants will be briefed and debriefed to obviate any fears of potential complicity in conduct in contravention or breach of s.8 CCA (1981), of which they are in no danger as previously stated: this study does not deal with observations of jury deliberations, and excludes serving magistrates and individuals who have served on the jury.

The opportunity to withdraw from the study is not a realistic one, as there will be no way for the researcher to identify which questionnaire was completed by any given participant.

CONCLUSION

Most existing literature, as well as previous researchers future considerations, suggest that evaluation of ‘trial by jury’ should focus on jury decision-making, but not be confined to an examination of the inner-workings of the jury. Much of the literature deals with the jury’s predisposition to the crime control or due process philosophies (Padfield, 2008; Sanders et al, 2010).

Very little research dealing specifically with the impact that perceived jury (in)competence has on public confidence in, and opinion of, the British legal system has been conducted. Public confidence in the legal system has increased over a period of time (Smith, 2010) and the public are more inclined to ‘trust’ the legal professions in as far as they have achieved academic and professional competence. The legal professions are regulated, accountable, independent and bound by a professional code of ethics – breaches of which can result in being removed from their position (Padfield, 2008; Sanders et al,2010; Smith, 2010).

That s.8 CCA (1981) has had a stifling effect on criminological research, and has impeded the advancement and dissemination of such knowledge that by its very nature could significantly ameliorate the legal system, and both increase public opinion of and maintain public confidence therein, was recognised by the Runciman Commission (1993). One of the Commission’s recommendations that was most widely and unequivocally accepted by the academic community was the amendment of s.8 CCA (1981) to provide for ‘proper and direct research into real jury decision-making’ (Runciman, 1993; Sanders et al, 2010)

When faced with the argument that the fact that the jury is without legal training really should be of no consequence as the judge is the ‘sole arbiter of law’: they in turn are the ‘sole arbiter of fact’ including questions of reasonableness and so on that are eminently suitable for decision by ordinary people, Baldwin and McConville (1979) presented quite concisely their ‘logical’ case for the prosecution: twelve individuals, often with no prior experience of the judicial process or HM Courts and Tribunal Service, are selected ‘at random’ to hear witness testimony and evidence (sometimes of a highly sophisticated and technical nature) and to decide upon matters affecting the life, liberty and good name of those having been charged with a criminal offence. No training is provided to undertake this task, the deliberations are conducted in secret, they return a verdict without qualification, and they are accountable and responsible to none other than their own conscience and moral compass. Following the trial’s conclusion they fade away into desuetude, returning to the community from which they are drawn.

It is my contention that the most appropriate and only logical balance and check mechanism to the independent, qualified and legally literate judiciary and legal profession within the adversarial system that can both inspire and maintain public confidence, is an independent, qualified and legally literate jury.

“If we cannot protect the integrity of the system,
 there is no system”

On Matters Cultural: Kilté-la Kwéyòl Zantiyé-Améwitjén - The French Créole culture of the Caribbean and the Americas pt.2

Wòb-la Kwéyòl Twadisyonel
(Traditional Créole Dress)

One of the most visual and vibrant aspects of the Créole culture is our national costume, which demonstrates our colonial heritage as much as anything else. In the French-West Indies, the national costume developed towards the turn of the 18th - 19th Century. Historians have suggested that the ladies' costume design originates from the styles worn in Southern France.

Typically worn only on special occasions, what has become known as the 'Wob Dwiyét', consists of a long petticoat called the "jip" (from French 'jupe' meaning skirt), a foulard, a white 'borderie l'anglaise' blouse and a madras headress. The Wob Dwiyét is accompanied by the wearing of various items of jewellery, such as long necklaces and large golden earrings).

As can be seen in the pictures above and below, a short full madras skirt is worn over a long petticoat, and is raised to show the beauty of the petticoat.

 

There are a number of special occasions when the jip is worn, including:

• Carrying the bride's bouquet at a wedding
• Carrying a child to baptised
• High Mass, Pontifical Masses and enrollment into particular church groups
• Carnival
• Weddings 

The headdress, called "Tête en l'air" whilst not only being a decorative feature, has a story to tell in itself. Traditionally the number of peaks/points demonstrated the wearer's civil status: 

• 1 peak/point - the woman is single
• 2 peaks/points - the woman is engaged, but you can still try your luck
• 3 peaks/points - the woman is married
• 4 peaks/points - the woman is open. but discriminative/selective of her suitors

 

 

On Matters Political: Baroness Thatcher - a personal reflection

Rt. Hon Margaret Hilda, Lady Thatcher

Baroness Thatcher of Kesteven

(1925 - 2013)

That the news of Margaret Thatcher's death was never going to be easily received (by me) should come as no surprise, but it was with great sadness that I learnt of her passing over breakfast on Monday morning. Given that Lady Thatcher was in her senior years and increasingly frail it should naturally have shocked more than surprised, but Lady Thatcher is...was... one of those significant few whose impact, influence and global standing far exceeded that of the 'norm' and who you could easily imagine living for ever (regardless as to whether this thought was a comfort or concern).

Of course history will remember the 'Iron Lady', the name Margaret Thatcher, all that she stood for, and all that she achieved: hailed by some as our post-war saviour, and by others as a curse.

Born in 1986, I was born under Thatcher's premiership. True, I am not old enough to remember life under her, but I was born into a society in the full throws of Thatcherism. It is in this respect that I class myself and my generation as the product of Thatcher's Britain. 

As long as I can remember I have been fascinated by, and shown an active interest in, history and politics. Much to the surprise (and at times chagrin) of my peers and those of my parents generation, I formulated my political opinions quite early on: monarchist, small 'c' conservative, and very much the nationalist. I found myself inspired by articulate, eloquent and charismatic leaders that were empowered by a transcendant moral code, guided by their principles that stood in proud defiance of all those that threatened the national interest, and ideological critics.

 

No one can deny that Lady Thatcher ranks very highly in the 'controversial politician' category, and no Prime Minister has been as divisive a personality as she... as much as she is loved, she is hated.

I do not deny that the darkness, the anger, the hate and the sense of betrayal felt by those whose livelihoods were linked to the mines, and the other industries that were thrown into disarray and chaos as a result of Lady Thatcher's war against the Trade Unions still runs deep... but Scargill was no saint, and the trade unionists of the day are guilty of deliberate historical revisionism and the worst kind of moral relativity. How quickly have they allowed us to forget that it was the Trade Union's damaging series of strikes during the winter of 1978–79, dubbed the "Winter of Discontent" - which left rubbish uncollected and the dead unburied - that brought Callaghan's Labour government down in 1979 paving the way for the Conservative march to victory. 

When Lady Thatcher took office Britain was, to use a term of many of the economists of the time, the 'sick man of Europe' because of its industrial strife and the lamentable economic performance of the Callaghan government compared to the other European countries. Following the market reforms instituted by Lady Thatcher, Britain experienced steady economic growth, outpacing other large European Union economies throughout the 1980s and 90s...leaving office with us at an enviable position economically, both in Europe and further afield, with the City of London the jewel of the Thatcherite crown. 

Lady Thatcher was a politician of principle, one of the few politicians that took a position and then stuck to it:

"To those waiting with bated breath for that favourite media catchphrase, the 'U-turn', I have only one thing to say: "You turn [U-turn] if you want to. The lady's not for turning."

Let us look briefly at some of her parliamentary record:

• One of the few Conservative MPs to support Leo Abse's Bill to decriminalise male homosexuality.
•  Voted in favour of David Steel's bill to legalise abortion
  
  
•  Voted in favour of a ban on hare coursing.
   
• As Secretary of State for Education and Science she gave priority to academic needs in schools during the administration's austerity measures and imposed public expenditure cuts on the state education system, which resulted in the abolition of free milk for schoolchildren aged seven to eleven, earning her the moniker of "Thatcher Thatcher Milk Snatcher"
  
• Though she was committed to a tiered "secondary modern-grammar school" system of education and was determined to preserve grammar schools, the percentage of pupils attending comprehensive schools  rose from 32 per cent to 62 per cent under her leadership.
• Her hard-line militaristic approach laid the foundations for Sir John Major, and later Tony Blair to bring an end to 'the Troubles' by signing the Anglo-Irish agreement in 1985
• The right to buy council properties was Lady Thatcher's policy, creating a home owning generation that previously would never have been able to exist
• If it hadn't been for Lady Thatcher and President Reagan, do you think we'd have won the Cold War without firing a single bullet?
• We won the Falklands War as a result of her conviction, commitment and strategic flair.
• When we hear talk of British Prime Ministers defending the British Rebate at EU meetings, it is the British Rebate that Lady Thatcher 'negotiated'.

• Lady Thatcher was Britain's first, and to date ONLY, female Prime Minister.
• Lady Thatcher is Britain's longest serving Prime Minister, who WON THREE consecutive elections, and left office NEVER HAVING LOST ONE.

Baroness Thatcher thrived on conflict and grew stronger because of it, but in the end it was conflict that caused her demise.

Now, people have their criticisms, their anger and their issues with the late Lady Thatcher. Tensions and passions are often inflamed at the mention of her name, but quite frankly this disgusting demonstration of pure and simple poison and soul-less ignorance that has been the response of a great number of people leaves a bad taste in my mouth, and repulses me to the very core. Not because of ideological, or political affinity to quite frankly one of Britain's greatest political leaders, but out of disgust and contempt for the brazen disregard for the feelings of her family.

Margaret Hilda, Lady Thatcher was a mother and a grandmother. That means her children have lost a mother, and her grandchildren have lost a grandmother. How in God's name do you suppose they feel seeing their mother subjected to such cold hearted, venemous and plain out of order reaction on the day of her death? How would you feel seeing your nan demonised and trashed on the telly, and in the media? How would you feel to see and hear of parties being thrown to celebrate the death of your loved one?

To those on the left celebrating and lauding the death of a frail, old lady out of nothing more than ideological opposition and inhereted political bias (because far too many people that weren't even in nappies when she left office are getting nasty in their comments) I would ask this: what does this say about your own particular philosophy and moral compass? what does this say of your humanity? 

"We're leaving Downing Street for the last time after eleven-and-a-half wonderful years and we're happy to leave the UK in a very much better state than when we came here,"

On Matters Criminological: How did the rise of the Right influence the growth of incarceration?

“The mood and temper of the public in regard to the treatment of crime and criminals is one of the most unfailing tests of the civilisation of any country”
(Sir Winston Churchill)

The Demise of the Welfare State and the New Penology

“Justice is incidental to law and order”
Director J. Edgar Hoover (F.B.I)

According to Matthews (2009) the C20^th’s philosophical persuasion in regards to crime control was that of bifurcation, balancing ‘exclusionary strategies’ (e.g. incarceration) and the community-based welfare motivated ‘inclusive strategies’ (Matthews, 2009). Since the post-war period, however, Keynes’s state project has come under increasing attack for the generation of a culture of pathological dependency, being too heavy a burden on the public purse (especially relevant today), for being far too pervasive and intrusive: taking far more liberties with the operational objective of ‘cradle to grave’ then perhaps Keynes himself would have been comfortable: the resulting consequences? Reorganisation, review and the inevitable retrenchment of the welfare state into a rapidly ever more overt ‘penal state’ and the prevalence of one side of Beckett and Western’s (2001) two-sided ‘policy régime’ (Wacquant, 2001a; Cavadino and Dignan, 2007; Matthews, 2009).

It is with this in mind that we turn now to the dawn of the ‘New Penology’: managerial and designed not to reform or treat the offender, but to identify, classify and control groups based on their level of dangerousness – unlike the ‘New Punitivenes’ which had as its crux the placing of moral blame on the criminal, and was by its very nature transformative (Feeley and Simon, 1992; Matthews, 2009).

Nonetheless we must always err on the side of caution when tempted to pontificate on the ‘causal mechanisms’ of the changing incidences and nature of welfare provision and incarceration rates. Whether one finds oneself in the ‘cum hoc’ or ‘post hoc’ school, it is wise to remember, all things being equal, that these are both examples of logical fallacy.

The rise of the Neo-Conservatism
The wind blowing through the corridors of power both in Whitehall and on Capitol Hill in the mid-late 1970s was of recrudescence in populist authoritarian ‘law and order politics’ that sought to restore the Neo-Classicist vision of a ‘voluntaristic criminality’, with its key concern of developing efficient crime control means, rather than questioning causality through the implementation of what has been labelled as ‘Strategy A’ policies in its approach to the penal system (McLaughlin, Muncie and Hughes, 2006).

The British political establishment had remained conservative for the better part of 30years, but the election of Margaret Thatcher as Prime Minister in 1979 saw the Neo-Conservative preoccupation with posited traditional morality and enforced social harmony take centre stage as she recited the prayer of St. Francis on her arrival at Downing Street.

Neo-Conservatism, defined by its inherent fear of social fragmentation, deviance and delinquency invokes an Aristotelian spirit in its assertion that good law and good order are the adhesives that keep society together (Aristotle). At its very heart are three principal concerns of law and order, public morality and national identity. Neo-Conservatism elevated the moral culture of society to the status of ‘explanatory variable’ of long-term changes in the levels of criminality and disorder (McLaughlin and Muncie, 2008). The American political scientist and éminence grise James Q Wilson – who later became an advisor to the Republican administration - was one of the main exponents of Neo-Conservatism, and with George Kelling co-authored the ‘Broken Windows’ Thesis (Wilson and Kelling, 1982) which has become the sine qua non contribution to the debate on social disorganisation, informal social control and crime prevention (Crawford, 1998).  Mrs Thatcher (1979-1991) and President Reagan (1980-1984) have come to personify this particular –ism.

As ‘social authoritarians’ (Heywood, 2003 p98) Neo-Conservatives take a very Hobbesian perspective on the root causes of disorder, propter hoc crime and delinquency can only be countered by a real fear of sure and severe punishment (Hobbes, 1651; McManus, 2010). Hall and Jacques (1983) interpreted the ‘law and order’ ideology as ‘authoritarian populism’, acting as both mirror and response to widespread popular anxiety towards the decline of order and morality in society (Heywood, 2003).

Central to this ideology is the assertion that more visible or aggressive policing and tougher sentencing will make society safer: the core function of punishment, according to this approach, - and interestingly also Durkheim (1960) - was primarily not to deter or rehabilitate offenders, but to re-affirm and strengthen the social bonds that hold society together, but seen in regards of its impact on the establishment of moral harmony through treating ‘undesirables’ as pariahs. Punishment was synonymous with retribution and, through implication, disproportionate to the offence due to its vital, symbolic role in community cohesion (Durkheim, 1960; Kennedy, 2000 p831; Comfort, 2005; Newburn and Jones, 2005; McManus, 2010).

Whilst criminality was intrinsic, it had to be dealt with within the wider context of multiple prevalent social pathological phenomena, attributable to the ‘corrosive influence’ of the liberalist modern culture. These were causally linked to the weakening strength of the sources of social authority (family, school, Church etc) and to the ‘corrosive influence’ of the surrounding culture that emphasised rights rather than rightness of behaviour (contrary to the Neo-Conservative maxim “it’s not about being right, but doing right”) and which celebrated self-expression to the point of self-indulgence (a sardonic analogy to much Left-wing criticism of life under Thatcher being a ‘conspicuous celebration of self’) instead of promoting self-discipline and moderation (McLaughlin and Muncie, 2008; White and Haines, 2008).

“The most disturbing threat to freedom and security is the growing disrespect for the rule of law”.
(Conservative Party 1979 Election Manifesto)

Mrs Thatcher’s government injected a heavy dose of “Strategy A” into penal policy – this meant, whilst no means across the board, being deliberately harsher in punishing offenders at every stage and in every respect. Mrs Thatcher undertook the largest prison building programme for decades, involving the start of two new prisons in each year from 1981-1985, together with further modernisation of the Neo-Gothic edifices of the ‘architecture of segregation’ (Cavadino and Dignan, 2007).

Under Home Secretary Douglas Hurd (1985-1989) the government’s policy became less dogmatic and more pragmatic, although still flavoured with punitive ‘law and order’ rhetoric. Epitomising the ‘Hurd era’ was the Criminal Justice Act (1991), which has been identified as the most radical legislative reform to the penal system since the Second World War, bringing the notions of bifurcation and transcarceration to the dispatch box (Cavadino and Dignan, 2007).  Hurd demonstrated that Neo-Conservatism is not ignorant to the universal truth that the world changes, so they must also change: conserve not all the past, just what is believed to be the best of it (Lyman, 2009).

No one was surprised however when, within months of the Act’s implementation, John Major’s government pursued even harsher Strategy A policies, articulated by Lord Howard, then Home Secretary, in his infamous remarks that “prison works” that took us into the phase of the ‘new punitiveness’ with its minimum sentences, the 27 point plan to crack down on crime’, through the punitive trespass and public order provisions of the 1994 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, mandatory minimum sentences in his Crime (Sentences) Bill and US-style boot camps for juvenile delinquents (Green, 1987; Heywood, 2003; Newburn and Jones, 2005; Cavadino and Dignan, 2007; Podmore, 2012).

Neo-Conservatives do not oppose change for the sake of opposition; they stand firm and question it out of an almost intrinsic scepticism of social experimentation, along the lines of “if it isn’t broken, don’t fix it – whether or not it works very well is not the issue, but that it is better than something untried and unknown is (Lyman, 2009 p138)

How did the rise of the Neo-Conservatives facilitate the shift towards penal populism and the growth of imprisonment?

 By playing upon the public’s notions and perceptions of crime, fear and risk (as well as the actual levels), by launching a moral crusade committed to a set of ‘vigorous virtues’, by bemoaning, rejecting  and repudiating ad absurdum the liberal democratic formulations that had theretofore permeated social scientific thought (such as moral relativism) and through the unflinching resistance to the liberals’ claim that welfare-oriented social reforms would ‘significantly decrease’ the national crime rate: which, its advocates suggested, was a result not of social inequality, but the growth of permissiveness and a dependency culture amongst those in reception of welfare benefits as well as an apathetic political class, the failed philosophy of rehabilitation as the sole point of incarceration and an increasingly feral and hostile generation of young people (Behrens, 1980; Hall and Jacques, 1983; Riddell, 1985; Letwin, 1992; Adonis and Hames, 1994; Heywood, 2003; McManus, 2010; Tierney, 2010).

Blair’s New Labour

The lengthy political dominance of Republicanism in the US and Conservatism in the UK led to vociferous debates within both the Democratic and Labour parties over the possible sources of electoral success in what was clearly a different time. The process by which the Democrats and Labour became ‘New Democrats’ and ‘New Labour’ has been broadly characterized as one of ‘modernization’ (Newman, 2001) and, centrally, involved a gamut of policy reformulation and image redesign. Cue the ‘third way’ – the transcendence of clichés and the balancing of old school social democracy on one side and neo-liberalism on the other (Le Grand, 1998; Newburn and Jones, 2005; Wilson, 2006; Downes and Morgan, 2007). It also involved giving considerable thought to the public image of the two parties and in due course, in the eyes of some at least, a process of ‘rebranding’ or image overhaul. It also meant paying particularly close attention to the importance of symbolic politics, not least within its criminological context (Newburn and Jones, 2005; Wilson, 2006; Downes and Morgan, 2007).

 Anderson and Mann (1997) suggested that ‘Blair was particularly impressed by the way Clinton had managed to overcome the Democrats’ vulnerability to attack from the Republicans – for their “soft” approach on crime, welfare dependency and family values – by taking aggressively populist anti-liberal stances’ (p. 22). Biographer Jon Sopel (1995) argues that Blair and Brown were certain that there were important lessons to be learned from recent experience in the United States: ‘not only in how to win, but what to do once you have won’ (p. 146). Rentoul (1995) understood the visit to have given Blair a sense of perspective. He seemed not only to have had an ideological epiphany, but also found the words to express and communicate his message of radical, populist, anti-élite, anti-establishment social moralism (p278).

New Labour's 3,023 new offences demonstrate just to what extent they had been seduced by the politics of penal populism. This surprising number of new crimes reveals the ease by which a government  can be tempted to legislate not based on empirical evidence or informed counsel but through knee-jerk reactions - to be seen to be "doing something" in the face of each new moral panic that the tabloids blew out of proportion (Wilson, 2006; Downes and Morgan, 2007).

As night follows day, so with the creation of all these new criminal offences goes the need to police these new offences, and then punish the perpetrators. Under New Labour prison become the place to disappear that troublesome population which had remained fiercely defiant of ASBOs, community curfews, on-the-spot fines, or the new variations on a police theme: Police Community Support Officers, Community Wardens or the private security guards who are now increasingly policing public space (Wilson, 2006; Downes and Morgan, 2007; Hitchens, 2012; Podmore, 2012).

With little community infrastructure to support people with mental health problems, or addictions - often the reason why "crime" is committed in the first place – the scope of prison was re-invented and became re-legitimised as the functioning alternative to the welfare state of Old Labour (Wilson, 2006; Downes and Morgan, 2007).

It is important to remember that while the second part of New Labour’s campaign promise to be "tough on the causes of crime" may well be as much a positivist inspired approach as it is a comfortable compromise between the factions within his party and the British public’s tendency towards cyclical penal populism, after thirteen years of a Labour Government criminological realists all recognise that this was both a sound bite and something upon which they knew they would not be able to easily deliver, not that it mattered - Blair had learnt from the Clinton experience that the only way for left-of-centre parties to claw back power was to ensure that they were seen to be "tough on crime" (Wilson, 2006; Downes and Morgan, 2007; McManus, 2010).

“Punish the feral rioters, but address our social deficit too”
Hon. Kenneth Clarke QC MP
Secretary of State for Justice (2010 – 2012)

If the winds of change were blowing in the late 1970s then an equally potent sea change, be it of waters clear and blue or clear and red, occurred in British penal politics in the early 1990s. Though it would be easy and convenient to reduce this to the impact of Michael Howard’s appointment as Conservative Home Secretary in May 1993, it would be deceptive. Howard’s ‘prison works’ speech at the Conservative Party conference 1993 however, did indicate something of a different approach in style and substance from his predecessors in the Home Office.

In Howard’s defence, it ought to be mentioned, that upon assuming office he was faced with a challenge that no Conservative Home Secretary had previously faced – a Labour counterpart that sought to usurp the very law and order territory that the Conservative Party had monopolized for almost two decades. ‘Tough on crime, tough on the causes of crime’ had first been aired four months before Howard became Secretary of State for the Home Department (Newburn and Jones, 2005; Downes and Morgan, 2007).

Crime on the up, popularity waning in the polls and the prospect of being outflanked by New Labour on crime forced Howard’s hand to react quickly and consistently. Taking back wherever possible the newspaper headlines and television screens from New Labour, Howard descended into near hyperactivity. However, there was little Howard could do to shake off Labour’s newfound assignations with punitive penology (Downes and Morgan, 2002: 296).

Considering the apparent consensus that existed between New Labour and the Conservatives on law and order there seems little to be gained in pondering how things might have been different if Major had defeated Blair in 1997. It is this conjoining of the parties in a new unspoken (or even desired) bipartisan consensus that is one of the major distinguishing features of the period we find ourselves in now (Newburn and Jones, 2005; Wilson, 2006; Downes and Morgan, 2007).

Both major political parties here and across the Atlantic have largely followed the same penological journey. In the UK, whilst the transition from old Labour ‘penal welfarism’ to New Labour ‘penal populism’ had many complex roots, lessons drawn from the American New Democrats and increasingly punitive Neo-Conservatism have been central (Newburn and Jones, 2005; Wilson, 2006; Downes and Morgan, 2007; Matthews, 2009).

Media influences on penal populism

Law and Order (inc. Law and Order: CI/SVU/UK), CSI (Miami/NYC/Vegas), Criminal Minds, NCIS, LA Law, Forensic Files, Cops (on  Camera/Uncut), Judge Judy, Hill Street Blues, Dirty Harry, Crime Watch UK, the Bill, True Justice, Patrol, a Touch of Frost, the Met, DCI Banks, Morse, Scott & Bailey. These are but a fraction of the variety of crime-related media that is so readily and popularly consumed by both American and British audiences: from ‘continuing dramas’ to live action recorded ‘real cases delivering real rulings’. The past two decades have seen more and more of this crime-related media than any other period since televisions became a commodity and its popularity on the increase, with the Law and Order franchise being the longest continuously running example. But what impact could all these have had? Is there a ‘Law and Order effect’?

Rosenberger and Callanan (2011) examined how perceptions of the four universally accepted justifications for punishment (punishment, incapacitation, deterrence, and rehabilitation) were influenced by consumption of crime-related media, using a survey of Californian residents. Their results indicated higher incidences of television news and crime-based reality consumption correlated with increased incidences of selecting punishment as the primary operational objective of custodial incarceration as opposed to rehabilitation. The more television watched, the greater the likelihood respondents would support the punitive justifications rather than rehabilitation. These results stood in spite of the various socio-economic and -demographic characteristics and experiences of crime such as fear, victimization, and prior contact with law enforcement (Rosenberger and Callanan, 2011).

Incarceration rates have significantly risen over the last thirty years in many countries, but most dramatically in the United States, which has the highest incarceration rate among developed nations. From 1980 to 2006, the incarceration rate in the United States increased by more than 300%, but despite a popular fallacy, this striking increase did not correspond with a corresponding dramatic rise in crime. In fact, crime has been steadily dropping in the United States longer than in the United Kingdom- since 1991 and 1997 respectively (Maguire & Pastore, 2007; Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2008; Walmsley, 2009 Rosenberger and Callanan, 2011).

Demker, Towns, Duus-Otterstrom, & Sebring (2008) have suggested that increases in incarceration rates are driven by increasingly punitive publics, but others suggest the role of public opinion is more heterogeneous (Rosenberger and Callanan, 2011). Nonetheless, all perspectives allude to the weight of public opinion on crime-related policy; studies therefore have endeavoured to understand the source of public opinion about crime (Rosenberger and Callanan, 2011).

Conclusions?

It is a common presumption that punitive public attitudes are derived from the direct experience of crime and victimization. People become ‘fed up’ with criminality and seek to strike back at lawbreakers. Social theories of punitiveness, on the other hand, typically portray punitiveness as a form of scape-goating in which offenders are just a stand-in population, masking more abstract anxieties parading as the ‘dark figure of crime’ (King and Maruna, 2009).

King and Maruna (2009) conducted a survey designed to explore both of these hypotheses with a British sample public. A multivariate analysis of responses found that factors such as economic concerns and the nostrum folk devil “the state of the youth today” accounted for a substantial proportion of the effect of actual crime concerns on punitiveness. Crime-related factors, such as experiences of victimization or the fear of crime, on the other hand, did not appear to be especially significant predictors of punitiveness.

Since the ‘law and order’ principles upon which the Conservative party based their electoral campaign in 1979, every major party has included in their manifesto a particular approach to crime control, law and order. The British penal system has been politicised and rebranded. No political leader wishes to be seen as soft on crime, and even if they may not believe in prison as the be all and end all democracy, being the voice of the people, would imply that with an increasingly punitive electorate the party that wins, is the party prepared to take the ‘war on crime’ most seriously (and perhaps severely) – consider how things might stand if we still had the death penalty.